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PARTY MANIFESTOS IN A NEW DEMOCRACY
GÁBOR SOÓS, PHD AND GÁBOR DOBOS
The aim of the paper is to explore the content of party manifestos in Hungary, a 
new democracy. Aft er describing the party system, it surveys the manifestos of all 
parliamentary parti es between the fi rst free electi on in 1990 and the latest one in 
2010 (except for the electi on in 1998). The adopti on, length and layout of manifestos 
are examined with the aim of fi nding temporal and structural patt erns. The last 
secti on focuses on the pledges made by the major parti es (government parti es 
+ the largest oppositi on party) in 2002, and formulate several hypotheses about 
the potenti al explanati ons for the variance in the number and informati veness of 
manifesto pledges.
1. The Party System in Hungary
Hungary is a third-wave democracy. Its democrati c insti tuti ons were established 
in 1989-1990. As a new democracy, it is expected to show all the symptoms of low 
insti tuti onalizati on. Instead, the party system in Hungary has been conspicuously 
stable since the end of the 1990s. The main features of the party system are as 
follows.
1. 1. Dominati ng Parti es
In Hungary, trade unions and other interest organizati ons play a limited role. 
The politi cal agenda is clearly set by parti es (Enyedi—Tóka 2007). The situati on is 
similar at the lower levels of government. While small local governments oft en elect 
independents, county and city councils have always been dominated by parti es. 
The cogniti ve map of citi zens and elites associate public life with parti es.
2. 2. Stable Parti es
The fi rst freely elected parliament was formed by six parti es. Unti l 2010, only 
one new party could enter the parliament for a single electoral cycle (1998-2002). 
Even that party (MIÉP) was not really new, as it splintered oﬀ  from a parliamentary 
party (MDF). In 2010, two old parti es fell out and two new ones entered. Sti ll, 83 
percent of MPs belong to parti es that had facti ons already in 1990.
Party facti ons are highly disciplined. Not voti ng together is an extraordinary 
event. Party centers eﬀ ecti vely regulate deviati on from the party line. The 
systemness of parti es is high (Enyedi and Tóka 2007).
3. 3. Less and Less Parti es
A decreasing number of party lists reach the 5 percent threshold and get into the 
parliament. While the eﬀ ecti ve number of parti es was 3.4 in 1998 (and even higher 
in 1990), this number dropped to 2.5 (2002), 2.3 (2006) and 2.0 (2010). The number 
of relevant parti es has decreased even bett er and reached the absolute lowest 
number, exactly 1, in 2010. (In all cases, common lists were counted together even 
if their parti es formed separate facti ons for tacti cal reasons.) The same patt ern can 
be observed at the local and county level. Presently, the number of eﬀ ecti ve parti es 
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varies between 1.8 and 2.7 in counti es. The change in the Laakso—Taagepera Index 
ranges between -0.6 and -1.9 since 1998.
4. 4. Bloc Networks
Parti es are embedded in organizati onal networks. As usual in democracies, all 
parti es have satellite organizati ons like youth or women organizati ons. The bonds 
to these associati ons are very strong. Party representati ves sit in the boards of 
associati ons, which, in return, have some kind of representati on in the party.
Parti es also have strategic associates. The connecti on with them is usually 
formalized in writt en agreements. These organizati ons have more decisional 
autonomy and oft en have their own source of income. Finally, parti es allies with 
ad-hoc partners in an instrumental way. The links are expected to be temporary, 
but some connecti ons deepen into a long-term relati onship. The borders of part 
networks are blurred.
Party networks are inter-organizati onal resource networks. They mobilize 
resources as a joint eﬀ ort. The resources include money, organizati onal infrastructure 
(like oﬃ  ces), informati on, access to media, ideology and acti vists.
What makes the party system interesti ng in Hungary is that networks are 
embedded in blocs. The parti es do not have the same organizati onal ecosystems 
(though there may be overlaps). Someti mes, they fi ercely compete with each other 
and their relati onship is laden with many confl icts. Sti ll, the networks cooperate 
with each other and form government coaliti ons.
In Hungary, there are two relevant blocs, which together form a party system.
5. 5. Two-Bloc System
The party system in Hungary is closed. There is no party that parti cipated both 
in a left -wing and right-wing coaliti ons. Parti es cohere along the left -right division. 
The party compositi on of blocs can be found in the Appendix.
The left -right polarizati on is high in Hungary compared to other Central European 
countries (see Enyedi and Casal Bértoa’s computati ons based on the European 
Electi on Survey and other literature). The volati lity of votes became low aft er 1998 
and party identi fi cati on exceeded the average of old democracies (Enyedi and Casal 
Bértoa 2010).
These data refer to a well-insti tuti onalized party system with a bipolar structure. 
It is not a two-party system, as the competi ti on takes place between party alliances. 
However, in terms of the insti tuti onalized politi cal logic, it has some resemblance 
to two-party systems. The internally more complex structure of blocs makes the 
management of unity within blocs more diﬃ  cult. Such a two-bloc system is not 
unique. In its organizati onal logic, it is similar to, e.g., the French party system.
While 2010 saw a step towards a dominant party system, this development 
cannot be interpreted as a sign of weak insti tuti onalizati on (actually, the opposite 
might rather be the truth). One cannot know whether 2010 is the beginning of a 
new trend. If the right-wing party bloc loses its majority in 2014, the bipolar system 
may fully return.
2. Party Manifestos In Hungary
The database of the following analyses includes the party manifestos of more 
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than 20 years from the fi rst free nati onal electi on aft er the collapse of communism 
to the latest electi on in 2010. To ensure relevance, the data collecti on was restricted 
to those parti es that successfully formed parliamentary facti on. The party system 
has been stable, so the number of parti es in the dataset is only nine (of which two 
fi rst entered the parliament at the last electi on).
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
Fidesz 5,4% 5,2% 38,3% 42,5% 36,5% 58,8%
FKgP 11,4% 6,7% 12,4% - - -
Jobbik - - - - - 12,2%
KDNP 5,4% 5,7% - - 6,0% 9,3%
LMP - - - - - 4,1%
MDF 42,5% 9,8% 4,4% 6,2% 2,8% -
MIÉP - - 3,6% - - -
MSZP 8,5% 54,1% 34,7% 46,1% 49,2% 15,3%
SZDSZ 24,1% 17,9% 6,2% 5,2% 5,2% -
Others 2,6% 0,5% 0,3% 0,0% 0,3% 0,3%
Source: Körösényi et al. (2009); Nati onal Electi on Committ ee (www.valasztas.hu)
Table 1. Parti es in the parliament (proporti on of parliamentary seats)1
The complete database will contain 28 manifestos. It was relati vely easy to 
collect the manifestos issued aft er 2000, as they are oft en readily available on the 
websites of parti es. The manifestos of the fi rst electi on are also digitalized, as they 
are now regarded as documents of a historic period. At the moment, 21 manifestos 
can be found in the database in a digital form. The 1994 manifesto of FKGP, an 
agrarian-populist party, has not been identi fi ed, and the other manifestos from 
1994 are yet to be digitalized.
3. Adopti on
Party manifestos are always adopted solemnly in Hungary. The reason may be 
legiti macy in two ways, internally and externally. Internally, such an act makes the 
commitments of the manifesto credible. Members and lower-level leaders receive 
guidelines about the policy positi on and ideological standpoints of their party. 
Members and acti vists obtain the feeling of parti cipati on by ceremonially accepti ng 
the manifesto In additi on to cogniti ve maps, manifestos present the moral order of 
the party. They make clear what is right and what is wrong, what is appropriate and 
1 Parti es: Fidesz – Alliance of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége); 
FKgP – Independent Smallholders’ Party (Független Kisgazdapárt); Jobbik – 
Movement for a Bett er Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom); KDNP 
– Chrisiti an Democrati c People’s Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt); LMP – 
Politi cs Can Be Diﬀ erent (Lehet Más a Politi ka); MDF – Hungarian Democrati c Forum 
(Magyar Demokrata Fórum); MIÉP – Hungarian Justi ce and Life Party (Magyar 
Igazság és Élet Pártja); MSZP – Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt); 
SZDSZ – Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége).
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what is unacceptable, who ought to be respected and whose behavior is despicable. 
What is more, the ceremonies of manifesto adopti on form and strengthen members’ 
emoti onal att achment to the party. By declaring the ideological and policy positi ons 
of the party, describing its moral vision and mobilizing members emoti onally, the 
adopti on of manifestos may signifi cantly contribute to the organizati onal stability 
of the party.
Externally, parti es in a democracy are expected to have a manifesto which 
contains meaningful informati on about their politi cal principles and intenti ons. The 
media doubt the seriousness of a party without manifesto.  Other parti es use the 
lack of manifesto as a politi cal argument of discrediti ng. Internati onal forces may 
also regard parti es without manifesto as irrelevant. 
Our analysis of party statutes show, that a formal approval of the party congress 
or similar assembly is required in every party in Hungary. The parti cipants of such 
party bodies are the representati ves of members as citi zens are represented in the 
parliament. The event of manifesto adopti on is always solemn, but ceremonial. 
Although representati ves usually learn the details of the new manifesto right 
before or during the congress, there is no case where the manifesto was rejected 
or signifi cantly modifi ed.
Party manifestos are always electi on programs in Hungary. The genre of long-
term manifestos which include basic principles is missing in Hungary (though SZDSZ 
experimented with it in 2000). Manifestos are normally issued one or to months 
before the electi on day. The major excepti on is the fi rst free electi on in April 
1990. These party platf orms were draft ed already in 1989. The reason for that is 
probably the strive of the brand new parti es for legiti macy both in the country and 
internati onally.
The importance of external politi cal pressure can be confi rmed by the case of 
those parti es which were unwilling to issue a manifesto. E.g., Fidesz was expected 
to win the electi on by a large margin (which eventually happened), so it did not 
really want to ti e itself to specifi c pledges. Sti ll, it had to draft  a relati vely detailed 
manifesto under the pressure of the media and other parti es.
4. Length of Manifestos
There is no obvious trend concerning the length of party manifestos in Hungary. 
Most texts are between 8,000 and 15,000 words. In terms of ti me, the average 









Source: own calculati on.
* Data will be available later.
Table 2. The average length of manifestos by electoral campaigns
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In 2002, manifestos were very short on average. That corresponds with the 
commonly held view that competi ti on was intense in that year and revolved around 
policies (as opposed to broad ideological stances). The data about electoral pledges, 
presented later, also point to the policy focus of the 2002 campaigns.
The excepti on in the other directi on is 2010 when the average length of 
manifestos was much longer than in other electoral years. That can be explained 
by party strategies in that year. It was clear that Fidesz-MPP would win the electi on 
with a large margin. They were interested in writi ng a lengthy manifesto to dispel 
the doubt of their preparedness for governing. MSZP, the incumbent party, was 
expected to lose the nati onal electi on, so it presented an ideologically oriented 
manifesto to highlight the values of the party and keep their core supporters. Both 
of the two newcomers, LMP and Jobbik, published very long manifestos: 71,900 
and 45,700 words, respecti vely. The reason is not clear, but one might formulate a 
few hypotheses:
• The new parti es felt an extreme pressure to legiti mize themselves as serious 
contenders. Therefore, they invested lots of expert ti me to draft  policy analyses as 
well as proposals for a future government. That also presupposes that the target 
audience of these parti es was not the electorate, but the media and other parti es.
• Both parti es targeted at young populati ons and extensively relied on on-
line communicati on. As digital technology allows the easy distributi on of relati vely 
large texts, no editorial limits were perceived by those who draft ed these parti es’ 
manifestos. Actually, LMP did not even print its manifesto out, its distributi on was 












Source: own calculati on.
Table 3. The average length of manifestos by electoral campaigns
The averages covers signifi cant variance in other years as well. In 1990, the 
shortest manifesto was 2,700 words (MDF, which emerged as the largest party), 
while the longest 32,000 words (SZDSZ, the runner-up party). SZDSZ consistently 
draft ed long manifestos, confi rming the image of a party of elite intellectuals, while 
the manifestos of other parti es varied in length to a signifi cant degree.
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The general conclusion is that litt le conclusion can be drawn. There is no 
temporal trend. There may be a link between manifesto length, on the one hand, 
and the intensity and policy focus of electoral campaigns, the self-legiti mizing 
needs of parti es, and the elite characteristi c of certain parti es, on the other hand. 
Nevertheless, all of these generated hypotheses should be rigorously testi ng.
5. Layout of manifestos
The layout of manifestos has developed a lot since the fi rst free electi ons in 
1990. The trend can be seen in terms of colors, printi ng quality and typography.
The black and white printi ng, which was dominant in the 1990s, were replaced 
with full-color printi ng in the 2000s. The quality of manifestos in 1990 was not 
that far from the quality of ‘samisdat,’ the underground press of dissidents. By the 
2000s, the printi ng quality reached that of business brochures. One could mistake 
a manifesto for a car prospectus.
In the beginning, party manifestos contained almost exclusively text. By the end 
of the decade, info-graphs became usual and consumer-oriented design has since 
prevailed. Probably it was the manifesto of SZDSZ in 2006 that reached the extreme 
point, as it looked like a Power Point presentati on with graphs and tables on almost 
every page, accompanied with litt le text.
Interesti ngly enough, the manifestos of the new parti es, that emerged in 2010 as 
users of the latest technologies, are black and white, and include no visual elements 
(Jobbik) or only a few (LMP). Sti ll, other campaign materials of both parti es are 
designed in a complex way, so the trend does not seem to be broken.
Merz és Regel’s (2011) typology, which categorizes manifestos along the 
dimensions of manifesto layout and length, is useful here to trace the developments. 
In the fi rst free party competi ti on in 1990, simple layout dominated, while the length 
varied from leafl et (MDF) to pamphlet (MSZP) and book (SZDSZ). By the 2000s, the 
layout became complex, but length has shown great variety from brochure (e.g. 





complex Brochure Magazine Catalogue
simple Leaflet Pamphlet Book
Source: Merz – Regel (2011:9).
Figure 1. Categorizati on by the relati onship between the length and layout of 
manifestos
6. Language of manifestos
Our analysis of party manifestos in Hungary was based on Rudolf Flesch (1948). 
The Flesch Reading Ease (FRE) test counts and weights word length and sentence 
length. The outcome may normally be between 0 and 100 (though lower and higher 
values are theoreti cally possible). Higher scores point to easier readings, while lower 
points indicate more diﬃ  cult readings. “Reader’s Digest magazine has a readability 
index of about 65, Time magazine scores about 52, an average 6th grade student’s 
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(an 11-year-old) writt en assignment has a readability test of 60–70 (and a reading 
grade level of 6–7), and the Harvard Law Review has a general readability score in 
the low 30s.” (Wikipedia htt p://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flesch%E2%80%93Kincaid_
readability_test, retrieved on 29-12-2012)
It clearly turned out that party manifestos in Hungary are very far from the 
writt en language the average citi zen can meet in the media. The FRE analysis of 
manifesto texts resulted in quite low scores. None of the manifestos exceeded 30 
points, which is conventi onally regarded as the borderline of diﬃ  cult texts. MSZP 
produced the highest score in 2010, but even this was only 25.8 points. According to 
the usual classifi cati on, such texts are normally understood by university graduates.
Manifestos in Hungary are not writt en for the average voter. Nevertheless, 
there is a clear positi ve tendency. As the graph demonstrates, the comprehension 
diﬃ  culty of manifesto texts has decreased since 1990. What is more, there has 
been a step forward at every electi on.
Source: own calculati on
Figure 2. FRE of party manifestos in Hungary
7. Purpose of Manifestos
What is the politi cal purpose of manifestos in Hungary? We use Leonard Ray’s 
(2007) typology that divides manifestos into three categories: (1) contracts pledge 
on specifi c policy propositi ons that are fulfi lled if the party parti cipates in the next 
government; (2) adverti sements put emphasis on broad policy diﬀ erences and 
make vague promises; (3) statements of principle present the identi ty, values and 
norms of the party.
In most cases, party manifestos in Hungary serve as adverti sements. Almost all 
manifestos discuss and evaluate the past in broad terms. Incumbents point to the 
alleged successes of their rule. Contenders frame the performance of the existi ng 
government in negati ve terms. In both cases, analyses are followed by policy 
proposals. They are oft en rather guidelines (rhetoric pledges) than specifi c pledges 
that would hold the party accountable.
There are excepti ons, when the specifi c promises dominate the manifesto. Such 
contract-type manifestos were draft ed in 2002.
Statement-like manifestos are published when parti es positi on or repositi on 
themselves. All the manifestos in 1990 can be categorized as statements of 
principles. Before the fi rst free electi ons, all the running parti es felt necessary to 
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present their identi ty and place themselves on the politi cal map. These manifestos 
also had a strong policy element, as the new democrati c parti es att empted to prove 
they are competent for governing. That may bring them closer to the contract-type, 
but the main reason for policy analyses and proposals is self-legiti mizing, not the 
direct persuasion of voters. The new parti es launched similar manifestos in 2010 
for similar reasons. Established parti es issue manifestos as statement of principle, 
when they repositi on themselves. One ot the two notable examples are the 2006 
MDF electoral program, which tried to maneuver the party from a loyal ally of 
Fidesz to the center. The other is MSZP’s manifesto in 2010, in which the Socialists, 
who could be sure of losing the next electi on, formulate their values for the core 
consti tuency.
8. Audience
Who is the target of party manifestos in Hungary? A very rudimentary disti ncti on 
can be made between universal and group-oriented manifestos. The former 
ones formulate policies that altogether serve the interests of the whole politi cal 
community. The latt er have real target groups whose interests are promoted. 
Methodologically speaking, it is highly diﬃ  cult to determine which groups are 
targeted with a rhetoric or specifi c policy proposal or even an ideological statement. 
For example, pledging the building of a motorway may address the voters in the 
region, the constructi on sector or the general interests of transport.
Setti  ng aside the methodological concerns, it intuiti vely seems quite clear that 
the large parti es target at a universal audience. That fi ts in the image of the two-
bloc system presented in the beginning of the paper. Large catch-all parti es compete 
for votes in every and each social group. More specifi cally to Hungary, blocs are 
culturally formed, so competi ti on for votes does not focus on the linkage to specifi c 
social groups. The various segments of manifestos may target at specifi c groups 
(like pensioners), but the overall message is that everyone obtains something and 
nobody really loses.
Smaller parti es specify more on certain groups. For example, SZDSZ positi oned 
itself as the representati ve of urban middle class, especially the inhabitants of 
Budapest, the largest city of Hungary. The parti es that emerged in 2010 also have a 
more specifi c politi cal profi le.
9. Confrontati on
As electi on campaigns, party manifestos also may be positi ve or negati ve. The 
diﬀ erence is in the focus. A manifesto may concentrate on the performance and 
future plans of the party. Or, alternati vely, it may point to the mistakes or evil nature 
of other parti es. The character of a party manifesto is largely determined by its 
confrontati ve or constructi ve intenti ons. Actual manifestos can rarely be placed at 
one of the extremes of this scale. Sti ll, analyzing them from this point of view may 
add a lot to our understanding.
Some broad hypotheses can be put forward in an a priori manner. One may 
presuppose that the level of confrontati on varies with the ideological character 
of the party, its politi cal positi on, or the degree of competi ti on. (1) There may be 
parti es that are more confrontati ve by nature. Anti -systemic parti es can fall into this 
category. Their manifestos are expected to be hosti le to the other politi cal players 
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at all ti mes. (2) The nature of manifestos partly may depend on the present and 
expected positi ons of parti es. Oppositi on parti es tends to be more prone to criti cize 
the government. (3) System-criti cal (but not anti -democracy) parti es, which are 
usually newcomers or repositi oned parti es, denounce the economic, politi cal, and – 
especially – moral performance of all previous years and are expected to issue even 
more confrontati ve manifestos. (4) One may also expect more confrontati ve party 
platf orms when the competi ti on is especially intense in the electoral campaign.
Not all hypotheses can be confi rmed in Hungary.
1) No party has always been confrontati ve in Hungary. New parti es are very 
criti cal, but they have never fully rejected the idea of the democrati c system with 
multi -party competi ti on. Therefore, there is no party whose manifestos always 
focus on the perceived enemy.
2) Oppositi on parti es tend to be more confrontati ve than parti es in incumbent 
government. For example, the manifesto of Fidesz, the major oppositi on party, in 
2006 was more confrontati ve than MSZP’s, the major governing party.  Sti ll, the 
tendency covers much variance. When the oppositi on with hopes of parti cipati ng 
in the next government wants to compete with the demonstrati on of competence 
and pledges peace aft er years of politi cal wars, its manifestos focus on positi ve 
elements.
3) New parti es, whose competi ti ve edge is their lack of politi cal past, have 
manifestos that analyze the performance of previous governments and oppositi ons 
in a highly criti cal manner. The party platf orms of Jobbik and LMP, which successfully 
entered into the serious competi ti on in 2010, and MIÉP, the surprise party from 
extreme right in 1998, all support the hypothesis. The best case is 1990, when all the 
parti es but the former communist MSZP were new. A major part of the manifestos 
was devoted to the criti cism and denouncement of communist ti mes.
4) Competi ti on is always in intense in Hungary compared to many other 
democracies. The winner is always clear. All electi ons but one resulted in a change 
of government. No party remained in government aft er a lost electi on. Coaliti ons 
are always made within blocs, and party blocs fi ercely fi ght against each other. 
Sti ll, manifestos do not always deal with other parti es. If the level of competi ti on is 
interpreted as the closeness of the main parti es, manifestos in 2002 should be of 
the most confrontati ve nature. Thus, the hypothesis of a relati onship between the 
intensity of competi ti on and the level of confrontati on is not supported.
10. Informati veness
Both authors contribute to the Electi on Pledges and Public Policy in Hungary 
project. One of the goals of this research is to count the number of pledges 
parti es make in their manifestos and assess the degree to which these pledges are 
accountable. Following mandate theory, party manifestos are expected to provide 
informati on about their draft ers’ policy intenti ons. According to the logic of mandate-
based democrati c theory, the winning party obtains authorizati on for carrying out 
a set of policies. Authorizati on presupposes the ti mely and detailed presentati on of 
policy proposals, otherwise it would be impossible to hold the elected accountable. 




Informati veness is interpreted here as the specifi city of pledges. Specifi city is 
measured at three levels. Pledges were regarded as fully specifi c if they contained 
numerical targets (e.g., increase of pensions by 10 percent) or a status change (e.g., 
the abolishment of legal regulati on or the building of a motorway). Parti ally specifi c 
are those pledges which indicate the change of directi on (e.g., pensions will be 
raised – without specifying the actual raise) and those which contain imprecise 
terms (e.g., low pensions will be raised by 10 percent – without specifying the 
precise target group). All other pledges were classifi ed as non-specifi c; therefore, 
non-informati ve.
The research project will cover all the electi ons so far and the manifestos of the 
2014 electi on by the summer of 2014. Manifestos of the governing parti es  and that 
of the largest oppositi on party will be included in the full database (seven electi ons 
and 26 manifestos).
At the moment, consolidated data are available for the 2002 electi on only. 
These can be seen in the following table.Table 4. Informati veness of manifestos in 
Hungary, 2002
Party MSZP SZDSZ Fidesz
Fully informati ve 44.5% 49.3% 71.4%
Parti ally informati ve 41.8% 31.5% 24.1%
Not informati ve 13.7% 19.2% 4.5%
Total 100% 100% 100%
There is apparently diﬀ erence among parti es. The government party, Fidesz, 
made more specifi c pledges than the two parti es that eventually won the electi on. 
Obviously, a single case does not allow much generalizati on. When more variance 
is available, a large potenti al for analysis will open up. Many hypotheses can be 
tested concerning questi ons about why a party is more willing to make informati ve 
pledges in its manifesto than others.
First, the target audience of the campaign or certain campaign elements may be 
important. Campaign promises are usually considered as messages to the general 
public. They may target at more specifi c audiences. That is hypothesized to increase 
the number of responsive and specifi c pledges to seal the alliance. For example, 
trade unions expects the party they support to explicitly and publicly commit itself 
to certain policies.
H1: The more the party is linked to specifi c groups (endorsing organizati ons, 
business associati ons, trade unions, client groups) in the campaign, the more 
informati ve the pledges in its manifesto are in the relevant policy areas.
That may be true only of the policy areas where the party has to commit to only 
one group’s policy needs. Where there is a confl ict of expectati ons, the party is 
hypothesized to hide these contradicti ons and make vague promises.
H2: Parti es make less informati ve pledges in policy areas where the expectati ons 
of supporti ng groups confl ict with each other.
The consti tuency can be within the party, too. Party platf orms, oft en based 
on ideological diﬀ erences, represent diﬀ erent policy opti ons. The party campaign 
must gain the support of intra-party facti ons by means of clear commitments to the 
policies they look important.
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H3: Pledges are more informati ve in policy areas which are important to one of 
the party facti ons.
The same caveat must be made as in the case of external groups. If facti ons have 
diﬀ erent views about certain policies, the pledges are expected to be more vague 
to avoid overt confl ict.
H4: Pledges are less informati ve in policy areas over which party facti ons have 
disagreements.
A third type of target group is the potenti al partner in government. The 
hypotheses depend on the nature of relati onships between parti es. When they 
have a history of cooperati on, the expectati ons of each other are well known. Like 
and old couple, they serve each other’s needs.
H5: The more insti tuti onalized the party’s relati onship with its potenti al 
coaliti on partners, the more informati ve the pledges in its manifesto are in policy 
areas which are important to the expected coaliti on parti es.
Even old couples have disputes, which they do not want to reveal.
H6: Pledges are less informati ve in policy areas over which expected coaliti on 
partners have disagreements.
The situati on is diﬀ erent when parti es expect hard negoti ati ons. Formulati ng 
strong policy statements is not necessarily practi cal. Clear pledges which are 
diametrically opposite to the policies of the expected partner may impede the 
success of negoti ati ons, as one of the parti es have give up on their publicly made 
promise. Making clear pledges which are exactly what the partner wants would be 
a loss of trumps. Therefore, promises in manifestos are hypothesized to be vague 
in the relevant policies.
H7: Pledges are less informati ve in policy areas which are important to those 
potenti al coaliti on partners which hard negoti ati ons are expected with.
Not only the ‘who’ may matt er, but the ‘when’ also. Parti es may send more 
rhetoric messages and make broad promises. The intensity of the campaign, then, 
oft en presses them to become more precise and formulate their pledges in a more 
informati ve way.
H8: Parti es make more informati ve promises as the campaign approaches the 
electi on day.
In all probability, the percepti ons of chances infl uence the level of campaign 
informati veness. The party that is predicted to be the clear winner of the electi on 
is expected to have only responsible pledges, but not many of them. On the one 
hand, they do not have to use pledges to compete. On the other hand, committi  ng 
themselves in the manifesto too much makes governing diﬃ  cult.
H9: The more a party predicts a clear electoral victory, the less informati ve 
pledges it makes it is manifesto.
Somewhat surprisingly, a similar outcome can be expected in the reverse case. 
On the one hand, competi ti on does not force informati ve pledge. On the other 
hand, a losing party focuses on its ideological messages to secure the long-term 
success instead of specifi c pledges which may be used by rivals later.
H10: The more a party predicts a clear electoral defeat, the less informati ve 
pledges it makes.
Therefore, one may expect the more informati ve promises when the competi ti on 
is perceived open.




Society is diﬀ erent from nature, as societal agents can learn. Social sciences 
work with subjects who can refl ect on their conditi ons. Citi zens are knowledgeable 
agents. They realize that parti es someti mes make pledges they  do not want or are 
not able to fulfi ll. The att enti on on credibility is especially high aft er scandals of 
unfulfi lled promises. At such ti mes, one may expect more informati ve pledges from 
parti es who must show their commitment to clear commitments.
H12: The stronger the accountability and mandate discourse, the more 
informati ve the campaign pledges.
The hypotheses presented in this secti on is meant to demonstrate the potenti al 
of pledge analysis for manifesto research, but do not amount to any completeness 
in terms of scope and breadth.
11. Conclusions
At this stage, our research is based on parti al data. Therefore, conclusions also 
can be only preliminary and tentati ve. Sti ll, some intriguing conclusions can be 
drawn from this exploratory analysis of party manifestos in Hungary.
1. Party manifestos are adopted ceremonially to provide internal and external 
legiti macy.
2. The length of manifestos is normally between 10,000 and 15,000, but there 
are major excepti ons.
3. The layout has become more professional since the 1990s.
4. Large parti es are of catch-all character and target at the whole society in their 
manifestos. Smaller parti es focus more on certain social groups.
5. The level of confrontati on in manifestos somewhat correlates the oppositi on/
government division and the newness of parti es, but is not very related to the 
general party ideology and the degree of competi ti on.
6. Manifestos were relati vely informati ve in 2002. Hypotheses relevant to 
manifesto research can be formulated concerning the variance in informati veness.
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